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POLYCHRONICITY IN TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS: THE IMPACT ON 
STRATEGIC DECISION PROCESSES AND PERFORMANCE OF NEW 
TECHNOLOGY VENTURES 
 
ABSTRACT 
 This study focuses on polychronicity as a cultural dimension of top management 
teams (TMTs). TMT polychronicity is the extent to which team members mutually prefer and 
tend to engage in multiple tasks simultaneously or intermittently instead of one at a time and 
believe that this is the best way of doing things. We explore the impact of TMT 
polychronicity on strategic decision speed and comprehensiveness and, subsequently, its 
effect on new venture financial performance. Contrary to popular time-management 
principles advocating task prioritization and focused sequential execution, we suggest that 
TMT polychronicity has a positive effect on firm performance in the context of dynamic 
unanalyzable environments. This effect is partially mediated by decision speed and 
comprehensiveness. Our study contributes to research on strategic leadership by focusing on 
a novel value-based characteristic of the top management team (polychronicity) and by 
untangling the decision making processes that relate top management team characteristics 
and venture performance. It also contributes to the attention-based view of the firm by 
positioning polychronicity as a new type of attention-structure.  
INTRODUCTION 
An interesting and practical focus for research on strategic leadership is to seek to 
understand the consequences of top managers’ temporal pattern of activities. Early 
observation-based studies focusing on what managers do (Mintzberg, 1973; Kotter, 1982a) 
argued that the managerial work is characterised by multiple, brief, interwoven activities and 
continuous interruptions. However, not all managers schedule their activities in the same 
 2 
way. Preference-driven variations in the temporal pattern of top managers’ activities could 
affect their decision processes and, consequently, firm-performance. This issue has not yet 
been investigated. In general, not much work in strategic leadership has expanded and refined 
ideas from early seminal studies that observed top managers’ temporal pattern of activities 
(Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella, 2009). Our study fills this void, in the particular 
context of new technology firms operating in dynamic, “unanalyzable” environments.   
We draw from recently emerged literature on the influence of timing issues on 
organizations (Bluedorn and Denhardt, 1988; Zaheer, Albert & Zaheer, 1999; Ancona, 
Goodman, Lawrence & Tushman, 2001; Ancona, Okhuysen & Perlow, 2001; Bluedorn, 
2002) to expand research on strategic leadership, which studies top managers and the 
consequences of their actions (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Carpenter, Geletkanycz and Sanders, 
2004). We focus on an important but under-researched temporal construct in terms of its 
strategic impact, Hall’s (1959) construct of polychronicity.  
Hall (1959) conceptualized polychronicity at the group level of analysis, as a dimension 
of culture. We define top management team polychronicity as the extent to which TMT 
members mutually prefer and tend to engage in multiple tasks simultaneously or 
intermittently and believe their preferences is the best way to do things (we adapted the 
definition by Bluedorn, Kalliath, Strube and Martin, 1999). In practice, managers in more 
polychronic TMTs switch extensively their attention between tasks (simultaneous or 
intermittent task-engagement), often in response to new issues or opportunities (Kotter, 
1982a). In contrast, in less polychronic TMTs, managers control attention-switching with 
techniques such as quiet times and appointment schedules in order to work on task lists 
sequentially (Griessman, 1994).  
We argue that TMT polychronicity is an important concept to introduce to strategy 
research because it reflects how top managers allocate their most valuable scarce resource: 
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their own time. Our main thesis is that since polychronicity captures the temporal pattern of 
activities of top managers (Bluedorn, 2002) it has an impact on strategic decision processes 
and firm performance.  
We propose that in the context of new technology ventures, TMT polychronicity is 
beneficial for strategic decision-making and firm performance. We examine empirically the 
relationship between TMT polychronicity and financial performance and between TMT 
polychronicity and two key strategic decision process dimensions: strategic decision speed 
(Eisenhard, 1989) and comprehensiveness (Fredrickson, 1984; Forbes, 2007). We also test 
whether speed and comprehensiveness partly mediate the polychronicity-performance 
relationship. We combine two complementary theories to anchor our model: a) The upper-
echelons theory, which suggests that top executives’ values and cognition at the team level, 
are reflected into their firms’ strategic choices, via the different ways executives process 
information (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and b) The attention-based view of the firm, which 
proposes that organizational choices depend on what issues and answers decision makers 
focus their attention on (Ocasio, 1997).  
We aim to contribute to the research field in three broad ways. First, we extend research 
on strategic leadership and upper echelons (Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick, 2005 and 2007; 
Finkelstein et al., 2009). We look at the effects of polychronicity, an untested cultural (value-
based) characteristic of TMTs; we also peek into the “black box” of the upper-echelons 
theory by introducing dimensions of the decision making process (speed and 
comprehensiveness) as mediators of the polychronicity to performance relationship. Second 
we contribute to the attention-based view by expanding its set of attention structures to 
include norms of time-allocation of top managers and by extending the concept of firm-level 
attention structures to the TMT level. Third, we extend work on the nature of managerial 
work, by introducing an established construct to capture Mintzberg’s (1973) and Kotter’s 
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(1982a) descriptions of interwoven activity-sequencing. We go beyond “typical managers” to 
argue that there is variation in polychronic orientation among TMTs. We explore the 
relationships between polychronicity, decision-making processes and financial performance 
using (for the first time in the literature of how managers spend their time) quantitative data 
from a relatively large sample of new technology ventures.  
The Context of New Technology Ventures. 
The context of new technology ventures is appropriate because it controls for three key 
moderators, with important theoretical and empirical implications: dynamic “unanalyzable” 
environment, managerial discretion and behavioral integration (Cannella and Monroe, 1997).  
Environmental dynamism (instability or turbulence) (Forbes 2007) is concerned with 
the presence of “rapid and discontinuous change” (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; 816). 
Daft and Lengel (1986), Atuahene-Gima and Li (2004) and Forbes (2007) distinguished 
between two types of environmental dynamism, namely analyzable (uncertainty) and 
unanalyzable (ambiguity). Uncertainty refers to absence of information. As the amount of 
information increases, uncertainty decreases, therefore it is analyzable. Ambiguity instead 
means confusion and lack of understanding (multiple and conflicting interpretations of a 
situation). Therefore, it is considered to be unanalyzable and it does not decrease with 
quantity of information alone; quality information that can change understanding is needed in 
unanalyzable environments (Daft and Lengel, 1986).  
New technology firms operate in dynamic environments, because of rapid changes in 
technology and market developments in their sectors (Yli-Renko, Autio and Sapienza, 2001). 
These firms are the embodiment of risk (Carpenter, Pollock and Leary, 2003), because their 
technology is new and its reliability and adoption-rate is unpredictable (Atuahene-Gima and 
Li, 2004). Moreover, they develop highly differentiated products, in new and often ill-defined 
segments (Carpenter et al. 2003). Market demand is unpredictable, as there are no past-sales 
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data and it is difficult to established buying intentions for novelties. Therefore new 
technology ventures operate in dynamic and unanalyzable environments. 
Moreover, new technology firms have high levels of “managerial discretion” 
(Hambrick, 2007) as executive orientations manifest themselves much more strongly in 
smaller entrepreneurial companies (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; p.108; Cannella and 
Monroe, 1997; Forbes 2005). High managerial discretion implies that TMT characteristics, 
such as polychronicity, strongly influence strategy and outcomes (Hambrick, 2007).  
 Finally, in the context of new technology ventures we can conceptualize polychronicity 
at the TMT-level, making the implicit assumption that TMT members will exhibit similarity 
in their preferences and behavioral tendencies. The assumption is valid as TMTs of new 
ventures are self-selected groups of people with similar values and beliefs and a strong team 
culture. Similarity among TMT members is consistently found in the entrepreneurship 
literature (Forbes, Borchert, Zellmer-Bruhn and Sapienza, 2006; Ruef, Aldrich and Carter, 
2003; Francis and Sandberg, 2000) and is explained by two different theories: a) the social 
psychological theory of similarity /attraction which asserts that individuals are attracted to 
others similar to themselves (Byrne, 1971) and b) homophily which is a sociological 
explanation based on the probability of contact: because people socialize with those similar to 
themselves, new venture teams of similar people occur at much higher rates than teams of 
dissimilar people (Ruef et al., 2003). Friendship and social interaction is common among 
TMT members of new ventures as team members spend long hours working together (Francis 
and Sandberg, 2000). Similarity in values, social interaction and work interdependence lead 
to behavioral integration among group members and to within-group agreement regarding 
perceptions of the work environment (Klein et al., 2001; Hambrick 2005)a. 
                                                 
a
 Empirically, there is prior evidence of within-group agreement in response to the group-polychronicity scale 
for managers reported by Bluedorn (2002) and Onken (1999). More importantly, in our dataset, we found very 
high within-group agreement about polychronicity among two respondents in each team (the ICC values ranged 
from 0.77 to 0.96 and the rwg values from 0.87 to 0.95 – see the method section). Moreover, during in-depth 
 6 
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
Upper Echelons Theory and Attention-Based View 
We build on the upper-echelons theory and the attention-based view to frame our model 
on the effects of TMT polychronicity. The two theories are complementary (see Cho and 
Hambrick, 2006) deriving from the bounded rationality theme of the Carnegie school. The 
underlying logic is that humans have limited capability to attend information, action-
alternatives and action-consequences, which results in their bounded capacity to be rational.  
The upper-echelons theory suggests that organizational choices and outcomes are 
linked to the way top executives filter and process information from their environment 
(Hambrick 2005; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). The way top managers process environmental 
information (and on this basis make choices) depends on a set of personal characteristics, 
namely their cognitive base and their values. The upper-echelons theory focuses on TMTs, as 
group characteristics will be far more predictive of organizational outcomes than those of the 
chief executive alone (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  
The bulk of the substantial empirical literature on upper-echelons theory has focused on 
demographic characteristics (age, tenure, education) as useful, albeit imprecise, proxies for 
executive cognitions and values (for a recent review see Carpenter et al., 2004). Few studies 
have examined the influence of values and cognitions directly because of the difficulty of 
obtaining psychometric data from executives (Hambrick, 2007). Our study responds to this 
gap by focusing on a cultural characteristic of the TMT, i.e. polychronicity.  
On another note, research on upper-echelons theory has yet to explain the exact 
processes that convert TMT characteristics into firm performance. In fact, this “black-box” is 
                                                                                                                                                        
interviews with eight selected companies, executives indicated a strong TMT culture and agreement regarding 
polychronicity (see Appendix 1). The above offer empirical evidence supporting the assumption of similarity in 
polychronic preferences and behaviour among TMT members in the context of new technology ventures.   
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one of the upper-echelons theory’s key shortcomings (Hambrick 2005 and 2007) and our 
study attempts to address this issue, by proposing decision making processes as mediators.  
Our model builds on the upper-echelons theory in two ways: Firstly, we focus on the 
TMT as the unit of analysis. Building on the upper-echelons theory’s main thesis that the firm 
is a reflection of its top managers we propose that a shared TMT-characteristic 
(polychronicity) affects firm decision-processes and performance. Secondly, we view the 
selective filtering of environmental information by TMT members (caused by 
polychronicity), as the key to what they focus their attention on and how their firm performs. 
The attention-based view of the firm is built around the concept of attention. Its core 
argument is similar to the one by the upper-echelons theory, posing that organizational 
choices depend on what issues and answers decision makers focus their attention on (Ocasio 
and Joseph 2005). In our view the attention-based view complements the upper-echelons 
theory in two important ways: Firstly, the attention-based view expands the set of “attention 
structures” (Ocasio, 1997 p.195), namely determinants of what decision makers focus their 
attention on. Apart from top managers’ characteristics deriving from their personality and 
their past, it includes firm-level attention structures, such as culture, rules, resources and 
social relationships. Secondly, the attention-based view highlights the importance of 
decision-making channels and processes as mediating mechanisms between attention 
structures and managerial focus of attention. A principal mechanism by which attention 
structures govern and distribute the attentional focus of decision-makers is via the 
channelling of decision-making (Ocasio, 1997).  
Our model also builds on the attention-based view in two ways. Firstly we view 
polychronicity as a TMT-level “attention-structure” that guides managerial focus of attention 
and strategic choice. The essence of the polychronicity construct in the TMT context is the 
extent to which its members prefer and tend to switch their attention between tasks. Secondly, 
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we build on the attention-based view to base mediating hypothesis of how polychronicity (an 
attention structure) affects decision-making channels and processes and subsequently firm 
performance.  
Polychronicity: A Temporal Construct at Work 
Consistently with the prior literature (Hall, 1959; Bluedorn et al., 1998), we 
conceptualized top management team polychronicity as a dimension of group-culture. The 
core elements of defining and measuring group-culture are shared values (liking of a certain 
behavior), beliefs (that a certain behavior is good) and behavioral tendencies (patterns of 
behavior, conventions, customs or habits) (Schein, 1985 p. 6; O’Reilly, Chatman and 
Caldwell, 1991; Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv and Sanders, 1990). In accordance to norms 
regarding cultural constructs and to the specific precedence of measuring polychronicity at 
the group level (Bluedorn et al., 1998), our definition and scale of TMT polychronicity taps 
preferences (values and beliefs) and behavioral tendencies.b  
We note that behavioral tendency is not the same as consistent actual behavior by all 
members of the group, at all times and at all situations, but indicate a typical pattern of 
behavior (Bluedorn, 2002, p.56). In this study we did not measure actual polychronic 
behavior, as this would require direct observation (this is a future research target). In essence, 
we make the implicit assumption (present in all cultural constructs) that cultural 
characteristics predict and guide actual behavior (Schein, 1985). This assumption is validated 
by theoretical, practical and empirical evidencec.  
                                                 
b
 Empirically, there is robust evidence of consistency between polychronic preferences and behavioral 
tendency. Bluedorn et al. (1999) validated the group-polychronicity scale with 11 different samples and a total 
N of 2190 people. More importantly, the preference and behavioral items in the scale were highly consistent in 
our sample. A sensitivity analysis showed that results did not change when we considered the preference and the 
behavioral-tendency items separately (see section on robustness checks). 
c
 Schein (1985) offered a theoretical explanation: as a group evolves from its inception, values and 
beliefs are gradually transformed from explicit social norms (ones that individuals are conscious about and are 
debatable) into “basic underlying assumptions”, which is the essence of culture. Basic underlying assumptions 
are so taken for granted and institutionalized that they seldom rise to the conscious level for extensive 
examination. These implicit assumptions are non-confrontable and non-debatable and guide behavior. 
Polychronicity represents basic underlying assumptions about the use of time (Schein, 1985; Bluedorn, 2002). 
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To control for the possible effect of situational differences (e.g. the speed of the work-
flow and the urgency of incoming tasks) on polychronic behavior we sampled people that 
work under similar conditions. TMT members of new technology ventures are all very busy 
and subject to multiple, incoming, “urgent” tasks; therefore, in our particular context, the 
variation in the behavior (i.e. the sequence of task execution) is attributed to differences in 
preferences.  
Looking through the lens of the attention-based view, we argue that the essence of the 
polychronicity construct is the preference and tendency to “switch” attention between tasks. 
Attention-switching captures both the simultaneous and the intermittent (back-and-forth) 
pattern of task-engagement mentioned in the construct’s definition; it implies that tasks are 
put on hold (remain temporarily incomplete) while other tasks start. Having multiple 
“unfinished” tasks in progress is a characteristic of polychronic cultures (Hall, 1959). Instead, 
engaging with tasks sequentially (monochronic work) involves “shifting” attention from a 
completed task to the next one in the list, without coming back.  
Attention switching before the completion of the current task (polychronic work) can 
happen in two ways: The actor decides to switch attention between the current task and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Observing the world of practice, Kotter (1982a) noticed that there was considerable variation among his 
top managers’ temporal pattern of activities, around some central tendencies. To illustrate the point, he 
distinguished the organized, appointment-based manager, who acted like a “military general” from the less 
scheduled manager who spent most of his time in interwoven informal conversations (Kotter 1982a, p97). Such 
behavioral variation among people doing the same type of work is the manifestation of differences in 
polychronic preferences. 
The managerial interest in time management also validates the assumption that time allocation can be 
guided by preferences (rather than the situation). Time management focuses on the mastery of timing and 
scheduling in order to increase output (Jett and George, 2003) and is about “taking control” of one’s time 
(Covey et al. 1994; Griessman, 1994). Time management manuals suggest that executives have a choice of how 
to use their time during the day. TMT members might chose to switch to a new task (e.g. a telephone call) when 
it arrives (behave polychronically) or prefer to continue with their existing task trying to complete it (behave 
monochronically). In the latter case, an assistant or an answering machine can be used to schedule the request 
for a later time. Executives can “hide” for a while if they want to (Tracy, 2007). 
Empirically, our interviews with 8 selected companies confirmed the consistency between polychronic 
preferences (scales) and behavior (as described in words). Executives explained that their polychronic behavior 
was intentional (preference driven) regardless of external conditions (see selected statements at appendix 1).  
The above theoretical, practical and empirical evidence validates our implicit assumption that executives 
can “take control” of their time during the work day, despite the apparent influx of urgent new tasks. We thank 
an anonymous reviewer for suggesting us to provide evidence to back our assumption. 
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another scheduled task in his/her to-do-list or the actor decides to switch attention between 
the current task and an unscheduled incoming task, i.e. he or she accepts an externally 
initiated “interruption”. Polychronicity scholars argued that treating unscheduled tasks as 
equal to planned tasks (i.e. accepting interruptions) is the most common behavioral 
manifestation of polychronicity for top managers (Cotte and Ratneshwar, 1999; Bluedorn et 
al., 1992). Minzberg (1973) and Kotter (1982a) observed top managers’ work-patterns and 
suggested that they are constantly at risk of interruption. Top managers cannot work on 
something for long, before something else arrives to compete for their attention.  
Polychronicity is a continuum. At the one extreme (low polychronicity) one task 
follows neatly upon the completion of its antecedent. At the other extreme (high 
polychronicity) TMT members would constantly switch attention between tasks and revisit 
tasks multiple times during a given interval. In the middle ground, TMT members would 
switch attention between tasks moderately, by creating chunks of uninterrupted time to 
complete specific tasks. 
Extant time research on the impact of polychronicity focused more on individuals and 
linked the construct with work-related outcomes such as job satisfaction and effectiveness 
(e.g. Arndt, Arnold & Landry, 2006; Madjar & Oldham, 2006). There is little research on the 
organizational consequences of top managers’ polychronicity, especially as a cultural 
characteristic of the TMT. Two studies reported that “considering decision alternatives 
simultaneously” increases speed of decision making (Eisenhardt, 1989; Judge and Miller, 
1991), but these studies did not focus on polychronicity. Two exploratory studies tried to link 
polychronicity with performance in small samples (Bluedorn, 2002; Onken, 1999) and they 
did not reveal consistent relationships. Our study fills this research gap by attempting to link 
TMT polychronicity with strategic decision processes and firm performance. 
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Our model on the effects of TMT polychronicity is shown in Figure 1. The 
relationships are split in three parts: the direct effect of TMT polychronicity on firm 
performance, direct effects of polychronicity on strategic decision processes and mediation 
effects of strategic decision processes on the polychronicity-performance relationship. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The Impact of TMT Polychronicity on Firm Performance 
Psychological research on interruptions, mental work-load and task-switching has 
shown that performance can diminish when people switch focus from one task to another 
and/or work on several tasks simultaneously (Hecht and Allen, 2005). Intrusions may have 
negative consequences because they can result in insufficient time to complete tasks; they can 
create feelings of time-pressure, stress and anxiety; and they can disturb total involvement in 
and attention to the performed task, which delays its completion or reduces the quality of the 
outcome (Jett and George, 2003). 
Perlow (1999) used a qualitative study to illustrate that software engineers had 
difficulty getting their work done because of the firm’s polychronic culture and the resulting 
constant interruptions by colleagues. The result was a negative feeling among the engineers 
of having too much to do but never enough time, which Perlow called the “time famine”. At a 
later stage the firm tried a less polychronic way of work by introducing uninterrupted blocks 
of individual time (quiet time) followed by time to engage in interactive activities (interaction 
time). As a consequence, productivity increased and workers were happier. 
These arguments would suggest a negative relationship between polychronicity and 
performance. However, in the context of the TMTs of new technology firms, we propose an 
alternative thesis, based on theoretical insights from the upper-echelons theory and the 
attention-based view and on early, seminal descriptions of managerial work (Mintzberg, 
1973; Kotter, 1982a).  
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Looking through the lens of the attention-based view, we view TMT polychronicity as 
an attention structure, a “cultural structure that governs the allocation of time, effort and 
attentional focus of organizational decision makers in their decision-making activities” 
(Ocasio, 1997, p.195). More specifically, we view polychronicity as an attention structure 
which favors the attendance of unscheduled interpersonal interactions over planned tasks. 
Benadou (1999, p.261) supports this view arguing that in polychronic cultures people view 
interpersonal interaction at least as important as the work to be performed.  
The core benefit for TMT members of attending unscheduled interpersonal interactions 
is an information advantage. We build on the upper-echelons theory’s core argument that the 
top managers’ “field of vision” (where they look for information) affects decision making 
and firm outcomes (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). We suggest that polychronicity helps TMT 
members to acquire “insightful” information via unscheduled interactions with other people 
(externals to the organization as well as internal employees). We define insightful 
information as timely, relevant, soft and privileged information that can change 
understanding. The entrepreneurship literature has recognised that insights are often 
unexpectedly discovered rather than planned (MacMillan and McGrath, 1997). The timing of 
the interpersonal interactions often makes a difference. Trying to schedule the acquisition of 
potentially insightful information at a later time might find the information-holder 
unavailable or not ready to share the insight.  
Our core thesis that polychronicity brings insightful information is illustrated in the 
ethnographic descriptions of managerial work by Mintzberg (1973) and Kotter (1982b). 
Mintzberg argued that managers work on their tasks in a continuous back-and-forth fashion 
to encourage the flow of timely information. Top managers play a key role in securing and 
distributing soft and privileged external information, much of which is available only to them 
because of their status. This soft information – which includes gossip, hearsay and 
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speculation - is valuable because of its timeliness. Today’s gossip may be tomorrow’s fact. 
“The manager who misses a telephone call revealing that the company’s biggest customer 
was seen golfing with a main competitor may read about a dramatic drop in sales in the next 
quarterly report. But then it’s too late” (Mintzberg, 1990 p.166). According to Richard 
Neustadt who studied the information-collecting habits of three US presidents:  
“It is not information of a general short that helps a President see personal stakes; not 
summaries, not surveys, not the bland amalgams. Rather… it is the odds and ends of 
tangible detail that pieced together in his mind, illuminate the underside of issues put 
before him. To help himself he must reach out as widely as he can for every scrap of 
fact, opinion, gossip, bearing on his interests and relationships as President. He must 
become his own director of his own central intelligence.” (Neustadt, 1960, as quoted in 
Mintzberg, 1990 p.166). 
 
Kotter (1982b) and Eisenhardt (1989) also stressed the importance of acquiring and 
distributing timely and relevant internal information in facilitating effective decision-making. 
Kotter (1982b) described how top managers obtain internal information via unscheduled 
interactions: “On his way to a meeting a general manager bumped into a staff member that 
did not report to him. Using this two minute opportunity he asked two questions and received 
the information he needed…” The early descriptive literature also suggested that managers 
favor verbal media, telephone calls and meetings rather than documents to gather soft, 
privileged information (Mintzberg, 1973; Kotter, 1982a). 
In the context of dynamic unanalyzable (ambiguous) environments, such as the one 
faced by new technology firms, decision-makers do not need to process large amounts of 
information but instead they need insightful information that can change understanding (Daft 
and Weick, 1984). When structural mechanisms (such as polychronicity) facilitate the 
acquisition of insightful information, firm-performance increases (Daft and Lengel, 1986).  
Overall, we build on the upper-echelons theory and the attention-based view of the firm. 
We view TMT-polychronicity as an attention structure (Ocasio, 1997) which favors frequent 
unscheduled interactions (Schein, 1985). The latter expand the TMT members’ field of vision 
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(Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and bring in insightful information (Mintzberg, 1973; Kotter, 
1982b). Insightful information from unscheduled events can generate new core-issues and 
initiatives for managers to focus their attention on (Ocasio, 1997; Ocasio and Joseph 2005) 
improving strategic choice and performance (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). We propose:  
Hypothesis 1: In the context of new technology ventures, TMT-polychronicity is positively 
related to financial performance. 
The Impact of Polychronicity on Strategic Decision Speed and Comprehensiveness 
The attention-based view suggests that attention structures affect the channelling of 
decision making. Building on this broad theoretical premise we link polychronicity with two 
key dimensions of the strategic decision process, strategic decision speed and 
comprehensiveness (Miller, Burke and Glick, 1998; Rajagopalan, Rasheed and Datta, 1993).    
Strategic decision speed refers to the velocity with which organizations execute all 
aspects of the strategic decision process, from the initial consideration of alternative courses 
of action to the time a commitment to act is made (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Strategic decision comprehensiveness captures the extensiveness with which an 
organization’s executives systematically gather and process information from the external 
environment in making strategic decisions (Fredrickson, 1984). Firms that scan their 
environment for greater quantities of information or that analyze environmental information 
more extensively – for example by employing quantitative analytic techniques to a greater 
degree – are considered more comprehensive (Forbes 2007). 
Therefore, comprehensive decision making is about systematically gathering quantities 
of information and extensively analyzing this information. Instead we argue that 
polychronicity leads to a different style of decision making. Polychronic work offers 
insightful information (which denotes information quality rather than quantity) gathered by 
managers in a non-systematic way. This distinction between insightful information via 
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personal interaction versus quantity of information formally gathered and analyzed was made 
also by other scholars such as Daft and Lengel (1986; p.559-560) and Eisenhardt (1989). 
Insightful information often eliminates action alternatives early in the process because 
of a key problem. For example, suppose that a TMT has to choose among four suppliers. One 
supplier could be quickly eliminated on the basis of soft external information that they are 
“too close” to a competitor. Another one could be eliminated because of timely internal 
information that their delivery schedule does not fit the focal firm’s production line. Early 
elimination of unsuitable alternatives saves time and analysis. Moreover, insightful 
information about the critical element defining a particular decision can focus the evaluation-
effort, again saving time and analytical extensiveness. Going back to our example, suppose 
that the TMT has insightful external information that the main differentiating factor between 
good and less good suppliers is their reliability of delivery. Managers can now concentrate 
their effort on comparing alternative suppliers primarily in terms of this key element, rather 
than analyzing every other aspect of the decision to the same extent.  
Overall, we build on the attention-based view’s key premise that attention structures 
affect decision making channels. We suggest that as an attention structure, TMT 
polychronicity channels decision making by influencing characteristics of the strategic 
decision process. Polychronic TMTs, because of their insightful information, can eliminate 
unsuitable alternatives early and focus their evaluation effort on key elements of the decision 
rather than evaluating everything to the same extent. Therefore, they can make decisions 
faster and they need a less comprehensive strategic decision process (in terms of information 
quantity and extensiveness of analysis). We hypothesize:      
H2: In the context of new technology ventures, TMT polychronicity is positively related 
to strategic decision speed. 
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H3: In the context of new technology ventures, TMT polychronicity is negatively related 
to strategic decision comprehensiveness. 
Strategic Decision Process Dimensions as Mediators 
The attention-based view proposes that the primary mechanism explaining the effect of 
attention structures on focus of attention is the channelling of decision making. Building on 
this theoretical premise we propose a mediation model where polychronicity affects how top 
managers strategize, and this affects how the firm performs. The mediation hypotheses are 
intuitively logical. Since strategic decision-making is one of the key activities of top 
managers (Mintzberg, 1973) their temporal pattern of activities should affect dimensions of 
the strategic decision process. In turn, differences in the strategic decision process can lead to 
variations in strategic choices and organizational performance (Dean and Sharfman, 1996).  
Specifically, we expect that strategic decision speed and comprehensiveness partially 
mediate the relationship between TMT polychronicity and firm-performance. We predict 
partial mediation because other, unmeasured strategic decision-process dimensions could also 
partially mediate the relationship. Moreover, polychronicity might also affect performance 
via other more direct mechanisms, such as better valuation of issues and answers (Ocasio, 
1997) due to insightful information (see hypothesis 1). In the following paragraphs we 
explain how exactly speed and comprehensiveness affect firm performance in order to justify 
the mediation hypotheses.  
The majority of extant empirical evidence has indicated a positive relationship between 
strategic decision speed and firm performance in dynamic environments (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Judge and Miller, 1991; Baum and Wally, 2003). The underlying argument has been that 
decision speed enables firms to exploit opportunities before they disappear (e.g. adoption of 
“winning” new products, process technologies or business models) and therefore, improves 
competitive performance (Baum and Wally, 2003). However, we note two studies that have 
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argued that accelerated decision speed can sometimes be detrimental to performance by 
reducing the accuracy and quality of the decision. (Perlow, Okhuysen and Repenning 2002; 
Forbes, 2005).  
In accordance with information-processing theory, which suggests that in dynamic 
environments a firm faces complex information-processing requirements that call for fast 
information collection and interpretation (Atuahene-Gima & Li, 2004), we predict a positive 
relationship between decision speed and performance of new technology ventures. Since we 
proposed that TMT polychronicity is positively related with decision speed (H2) and the 
latter is positively related to firm performance, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4: In the context of new technology ventures, strategic decision speed will 
partially mediate the relationship between TMT polychronicity and firm performance. 
Specifically, polychronicity will be positively related to speed and the latter positively related 
to performance. 
The literature features two contradicting perspectives regarding the strategic outcomes 
of comprehensiveness in dynamic environments (Atuahene-Gima and Li, 2004; Forbes, 2007; 
Priem, Lyon & Dess, 1999). The first perspective predicts that environmental dynamism 
increases the benefits that can be attained through comprehensiveness, as unstable 
environments require the collection and analysis of large amounts of information (Glick, 
Miller & Huber, 1993) which must be studied diligently (Miller and Friesen, 1983). On the 
other hand, the second perspective contends that environmental dynamism decreases the 
benefits of comprehensiveness while simultaneously increasing its costs (Hough and White, 
2003). Fredrickson and Mitchell (1984) argued that a non-comprehensive firm is well-
equipped for an unstable environment. Its decision speed and flexibility allow fast, low-cost 
action that can exploit a changing list of opportunities that defy thorough understanding.  
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Two recent studies attempted to resolve this contradiction, (Atuahene-Gima and Li, 
2004; Forbes, 2007). Based on information-processing theory, they suggested that decision 
comprehensiveness raises performance under unstable but analyzable environments (where 
more information is useful), but it hurts performance under unstable but unanalyzable ones 
(where information-quantity is costly and often misleading). Since new technology firms 
operate in unanalyzable environments we predict a negative relationship between decision 
comprehensiveness and firm performance. We also proposed that TMT polychronicity is 
negatively correlated with decision comprehensiveness (H3), and so we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5: In the context of new technology ventures, strategic decision 
comprehensiveness will partially mediate the relationship between TMT polychronicity and 
firm performance. Specifically polychronicity will be negatively related to comprehensiveness 
and the latter negatively related to performance. 
 
METHODS 
Sample and Data Collection 
We surveyed the total population of 305 new technology ventures, listed in the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) in 2001. How long for a firm is still considered new, is a debate in the 
entrepreneurship literature. Opinions on the length of the “liability of newness” range 
between a cut-off of 6 years (e.g. Zahra, Ireland and Hitt, 2000), 8 years (e.g. Atuahene-Gima 
and Li, 2004) or 10 years (e.g. Yli-Renko et al., 2001). We adopted an 8-year cut-off point, 
which is neither too conservative nor too inclusive. As a robustness check we run the analysis 
with a subsample of firms less than 6 years old and the results did not change.  
We ensured that our firms were involved in technology creation by checking their SIC 
codes and their detailed business descriptions in their annual reports (following Yli-Renko et 
al., 2001). The firms were spread across the typical range of high-technology sectors, namely 
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computers, telecommunications, chemicals and materials, electronics and life sciences. We 
focused on listed new technology firms because they represent an important sector that 
creates significant employment opportunities (Shane, 1996).  
Data on TMT polychronicity, decision speed and comprehensiveness were obtained via 
a questionnaire. We mailed a questionnaire to the CEO of each firm as the most 
knowledgeable informant for the TMT (Simons, Pelled and Smith, 1999). We received 217 
replies, 197 of which were finally usable, for an effective response rate of 64.6%, which is 
well above the 15% average (e.g. Simons et al., 1999). This high response rate was achieved 
by pilot-testing the questionnaire with 5 academics and 10 executives and by a campaign of 
introductory and reminding telephone calls and emails, in accordance with the principles 
outlined by Dillman (2000).  
For the purpose of corroborating the team-level data (polychronicity, speed and 
comprehensiveness), we sent a second questionnaire to the next most senior member in the 
TMT as indicated by the CEO. Second respondent corroboration is a common robustness 
check for firm and team level data (e.g., Atuahene-Gima and Murray, 2004). 129 executives 
responded providing colleague-responses of 42.3% of the firms in our sample. Basic 
demographics of the CEOs and second respondents are presented on table 1. The second 
responses were used to statistically test for interrater agreement for the team variables. 
Firstly, we ran a one-way ANOVA to ensure that the variance between teams was greater 
than the variance within teams, which was positively confirmed for all variables. 
Subsequently, we calculated intraclass correlation coefficients ICC[1] and ICC[2] (Shrout 
and Fleiss, 1979; Bartko, 1976) and interrater agreement rwg (James, Demaree and Wolf, 
1984) reported later for each variable. The ICC values ranged from 0.77 to 0.96 and the rwg 
values from 0.87 to 0.95 demonstrating very high interrater agreement. 
Insert table 1 about here 
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To maintain empirical rigor, the results presented in this manuscript are based on the 
sub-sample of companies (N=129) for which we had two respondents. Since we had high 
interrater agreement, we averaged the values of the two respondents for the team variables. 
We checked for non-response bias comparing: a) the final sample of 129 firms with two 
respondents with the non-responding firms in the population (176) and b) the larger sample of 
197 firms for which we had at least one respondent (we used this sample for robustness 
checks) with the rest of the firms in the population (108). We compared groups on a number 
of dimensions such as performance, firm size, firm age, TMT tenure and TMT size. The t-
tests demonstrated no significant differences and therefore we did not face selection bias. 
Data on firm performance and other firm characteristics (age, size and line of business) 
were retrieved from annual reports and from the most accurate and popular database of UK 
firms, Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME). To allow for temporal lags, we collected 
performance-data one year after we administered the instrument (at t+1). 
The questionnaire prompted the CEOs to identify the members of their TMTs. This 
direct approach to identifying the TMT is more common and more appropriate for studies 
focusing on strategic decision-making, than the alternative strategy of identifying the team 
indirectly by archival data of members’ titles and positions (Cohen & Bailey, 1997). After 
obtaining the names of the TMT members from the questionnaire, we found archival data on 
their backgrounds from annual reports and website biographies. We then calculated TMT-
level demographic characteristics and used them as control variables.  
Measures and Reliability  
New-venture financial performance. Consistent with prior studies in a similar context 
(e.g. Murphy, Trailer and Hill 1996; Robinson and McDougall, 2001) we selected two 
widely-used performance measures: Return on Total Assets (ROTA) as a measure of new 
venture efficiency and Return on Sales (ROS) as a measure of new venture profitability. Our 
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reported results are based on archival objective measures obtained from the FAME database. 
Correlation between the two performance measures was high as expected (0.68). To increase 
parsimony, we standardized the two indicators and averaged their values, creating a 
composite measure of financial performance (as recommended by Venkatraman and 
Ramanujam, 1986 and Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993).  
We also asked respondents to report their satisfaction with their firms’ ROTA and ROS 
on a 5-point scale ranging from very unsatisfied to very satisfied. Subjective measures of 
performance are also widely used in strategy and entrepreneurship research. The correlations 
between the subjective measures and the respective archival objective measures were high 
(.61, p<0.01 for ROTA and .63, p<0.01 for ROS).  
We decided not to rely on stock-market measures of performance for theoretical and 
practical reasons. Top management teams have greater control over (internal) accounting 
measures than over (external) stock market measures of performance (Murphy, 1999). This is 
due to their ability to control levels of investment, adjust discretionary accruals, and shift 
earnings across periods. Stock market measures are subject to greater levels of extraneous 
noise than are accounting measures (Agle, Nagarajan, Sonnenfeld and Sribivasan, 2006). 
This noise was aggravated in our particular case by the crash of the technology stocks in 
London (and globally) in 2001, the year of the survey. In accordance with other scholars (e.g. 
Berry and Sakakibara, 2008; p.21) we felt that the burst of a tech-bubble would reduce the 
accuracy of market based measures for that particular time period.  
Polychronicity in top management teams. Bluedorn and his colleagues have developed 
and thoroughly validated a scale to measure group polychronicity (Bluedorn et al., 1999; 
Bluedorn, Kauffman & Lane, 1992). Consistent with similar studies (e.g. Hecht & Allen, 
2005; Slocombe & Bluedorn, 1999), we measured TMT polychronicity by using a concise 
five-item version of the scale (Bluedorn et al., 1992). We measured the items along a 5-point 
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Likert scale (α = 0.96). Two items were reversed scored. Statistical checks indicated high 
interrater agreement for the two respondents [F=10.6, p<.001; ICC[1] = 0.77; ICC[2] = 0.88; 
rwg = 0.87]. A factor analysis of the scale showed that all 5 items loaded cleanly on one 
factor and therefore the construct is unidimensional. Since polychronicity is a relatively new 
and complex construct we did further tests to assess the validity of the scale. Firstly, we 
conducted in-depth interviews in 8 companies in the sample asking top managers to describe 
their temporal pattern of activities. We then compared these descriptions with the 
polychronicity scores measured with the scale (see appendix 1). We observe that the scale 
captured the polychronic orientation described in words (evidence of convergent validity). 
Secondly, we followed the procedure described by Bluedorn et al. (1998) and conducted a 
“know-groups” test for content validity in a new sample of 116 managers studying for an 
Executive MBA (see appendix 2). We created two opposing scenarios of high and low 
polychronicity (known measure) and we split our sample in two equal-size parts. Each 
participant had to read one scenario (either high or low) and answer to the scale as managers 
of the company in the scenario would. The mean difference between the high and low 
polychronicity scenario was highly significant (t=15.3, p<0.001) providing evidence of the 
content validity of the scale. 
Strategic Decision Speed. We adapted and employed Schriber and Gutek’s (1987) 
“pace” instrument to measure strategic decision speed. Our choice in utilizing this three item 
scale (α = 0.96) for speed rather than the “duration of the firm’s most important decision” 
(e.g. Forbes, 2005; Judge & Miller, 1991), was motivated by recommendations from 
respondents and industry leaders in our pilot study. They said that measuring the duration of 
the most important decision depends too much on the respondent’s decision choice and on the 
nature of this one decision. It was felt that Schriber and Gutek’s more general instrument 
(across decisions) was more appropriate since we wanted to determine the organization’s 
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customary (average) speed in strategic decision-making. The choice of measure was also 
supported by empirical evidence that duration measures are in agreement with general speed 
scales when rated by the same respondent (Wally and Baum, 1994). Statistical checks 
indicated high interrater agreement for the two respondents [F=42.4, p<.001; ICC[1] = 0.91; 
ICC[2] = 0.96; rwg = 0.95]. 
Strategic Decision Comprehensiveness. We employed Miller’s et al. (1998) five 5-point 
Likert scale items (α = 0.86). As with Miller et al., we decided against the use of scenario-
based items because we thought that these items were generally perceived to be artificial, 
complex and hence, harder to administer to respondents. Statistical checks indicated high 
interrater agreement [F=14.1, p<.001; ICC[1] = 0.84; ICC[2] = 0.91; rwg = 0.91]  
Consistent with previous TMT and strategic decision process studies (e.g. Barrick 
Okhuysen and Repenning 2007), we controlled for firm-level variables (firm size, firm age) 
and TMT demographics (TMT size, average age, average tenure, average education level, 
age diversity, tenure diversity, education diversity). These variables have been identified as 
forces that could influence strategic decision processes and outcomes (e.g. Hambrick, 2005 
and 2007; Miller et al., 1998). Firm size was measured as the number of employees. The 
logarithm of size was used in the actual statistical analysis, which is the traditional way to 
minimize the impact of large outlier firms. Firm age was measured as the number of years 
since the organization was established. TMT size was measured as the number of individuals 
who were designated by CEO respondents as members of their TMT. TMT average age was 
measured as the mean of the age of all the TMT members. TMT average tenure was 
measured as the mean number of years of each TMT member as part of the TMT. TMT 
average education level was measured as the mean number of years in post-secondary 
education of each TMT member. TMT age, tenure and education diversity were measured by 
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the coefficient of variation (ratio of the standard deviation to the mean) of each respective 
variable.  
We also added industry effects to the control listd. We created dummy variables for the 
most important technology industries in our sample: information technology (35.7%), 
telecommunications (7.8%), chemicals and materials (4.7%), electronics (13.2%), life 
sciences (4.7%), technology-based services (R&D and testing) (18.5%) and others (15.4%). 
To minimize the probability of common method bias, we adhered to suggestions by 
Atuahene-Gima and Li (2004) and Papadakis, Lioukas and Chambers’s (1998). First, we 
combined archival and survey data. Then we reversed some scale anchors to decrease the 
development of undesired response patterns. We examined the psychometric properties of the 
administered scales by conducting first factor analysis and then a confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) model. Principal component analysis with varimax rotation found a three-factor 
solution that explains 82.5% of the total variance. All the measures “loaded” cleanly on 
separate factors (See Appendix 2.) The results of the CFA indicated that the measurement 
model fitted the data reasonably well (χ2/df = 1.96; GFI = .96; CFI = .98; NFI = .98; RMSEA 
= .07). The constructs had high reliability, all having alphas over .70 (See table 2). Further 
evidence of reliability was provided by calculating Composite Reliability (CR) - an estimate 
of internal consistency analogous to an alpha coefficient - and Average Variance Extracted 
(AVE) (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). For all measures, the CR was well above the cut-off 
value of 0.70 and the AVE exceeded the .50 cut-off value. (See Table 2). Then we assessed 
discriminant validity; a construct should share more variance with its measures than with 
other constructs in the model, so the square root of the AVE should exceed the 
                                                 
d
 ROTA and ROS were not consistently available for the year before the survey (t-1) to control for past 
performance. Many companies in our sample had just entered the public market and there were no publicly 
available financial ratios for their previous year. As an alternative proxy for past performance, we tested the 
dollar value of sales at t-1 (found consistently from FAME database), which controls for incoming cash flow. 
However, one could argue that total past revenues is more a measure of firm size than past performance. Since 
adding the variable did not have influence on the main pattern of results, we report the more parsimonious 
results without it. We thank one anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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intercorrelations of the construct with the other constructs in the model (Fornell and Larcker, 
1981). In our study, none of the intercorrelations of the constructs exceed the square root of 
the AVE, shown as the diagonal elements of the three latent constructs in Table 2.   
Analysis 
We tested the hypotheses with hierarchical regressions, regressing first the controls and 
then the predictors. The standard Baron and Kenny (B&K) (1986) approach to test mediation 
with a series of regressions was preferred to the structural equation modelling approach; since 
we hypothesized partial mediation, there is little statistical difference in how the two 
approaches test for mediation (James, Mulaik and Brett, 2008) and B&K has the advantage of 
being able to incorporate multiple controls. For the performance models, we estimated the 
parameters with Robust Standard Errors because of a heteroscedasticity problem (a Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test gave a  of 28.42, p<0.001). 
RESULTS   
Table 2 shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the study 
variables.  Insert Table 2 about here. 
As high levels of multicollinearity can result in unstable regression coefficients in linear 
regression models, we followed procedures outlined by Besley, Kuh, and Welsh (1980). We 
calculated condition indices for each of the regression models and the indices were far below 
the level of 10.0 for mild collinearity. Hence, no serious multicollinearity problems were 
expected. Correlation analysis as shown in Table 2 gives an early insight into the 
relationships between constructs. The correlations among TMT polychronicity, speed, 
comprehensiveness and financial performance are all statistically significant at p < 0.01 and 
in the expected directions. Table 3 presents the regression results for effects on speed and 
comprehensiveness, and table 4 presents results for effects on performance.   
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here. 
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In accordance with extant literature (e.g. Certo, Lester, Dalton and Dalton, 2006; Priem 
Lyon and Dess, 1999; Papadakis et al., 1998), we found modest support for the effects of 
TMT demographic control variables. TMT tenure, age and educational diversity were all 
positively correlated with financial performance; their effect became weaker as more control 
and predictor variables entered the regression models. Firm size had a positive effect on 
performance, which became insignificant as the predictors came into the models. Firm age 
was positively correlated with performance, but its effect was not significant in the 
multivariate models. Industry was correlated with performance for two industrial classes, 
information technology and chemicals and materials.  
As for the predictors, the coefficients for the direct relationships were all significant and 
in the direction predicted. Models 1 and 2 confirmed hypothesis 2, positing that TMT 
polychronicity has a positive impact on strategic decision speed (β = .65, p <  .001). Models 3 
and 4 confirmed hypothesis 3, which predicted that polychronicity has a negative effect on 
strategic decision comprehensiveness (β = -.35, p <  .001). Models 5 and 6 confirmed 
hypothesis 1, which predicted that polychronicity has a direct positive effect on financial 
performance (β = .53, p <  .001). 
According to Baron and Kenny (1986) to establish partial mediation (hypotheses 4 and 
5), we need the following conditions: First, polychronicity (the independent variable) should 
predict speed and comprehensiveness (the mediators), which is already established by models 
1 to 4. Second, polychronicity should predict financial performance (the dependent variable), 
which is established by models 5 and 6. Third, speed and comprehensiveness should affect 
financial performance when entered in a regression together with polychronicity. This is 
established by models 8-10. In model 8 speed is positively related to performance in the 
presence of polychronicity (β = .44, p <  .001).  In model 9 comprehensiveness is negatively 
related to performance in the presence of polychronicity (β = -.50, p <  .001). In model 10 
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speed and comprehensiveness together predict performance in the presence of polychronicity 
(for speed β = .23, p <  .05; for comprehensiveness β = -.43, p <  .001). Finally, the effects of 
polychronicity on performance should be reduced when speed and comprehensiveness are 
included in the regression equation. This condition is also confirmed as the effect of 
polychronicity drops substantially from model 6 (β = .53, p <  .001) to model 8 (β = .25, p <  
.01), model 9 (β = .36, p <  .001) and model 10 (β = .24, p <  .01). The significance of the drop 
of the polychronicity effect from model 6 to model 10 was formally confirmed with a Sobel 
test (Sobel statistic = 4.26, p <0.001 for speed and 3.14, p<0.001 for comprehensiveness). 
We run a series of robustness checks and the results proved robust: a) We estimated the 
parameters for the performance models with standard OLS regressions, b) We run the 
analysis with the larger sample of 197 firms for which we had only one respondent (the 
CEO), c) We separated the items measuring polychronicity as preference only (items 1, 2, 5) 
from the ones that measured polychronicity as behavioral tendency (items 3 & 4) and we run 
two separate analyses one for preference and one for behavioral items, d) We run the analysis 
with the subjective measures of performance. For all the above analyses, the results proved 
stable in terms of the direction and statistical significance of the hypothesized relationshipse. 
Moreover, we run a sensitivity analysis and found that the relationships generally hold within 
individual sectors. In summary, the results largely supported our hypotheses.  
DISCUSSION 
The primary purpose of this study was to test the effect of TMT polychronicity, an 
important but under-researched temporal construct in terms of its strategic impact. Our results 
showed that TMT polychronicity has a positive effect on venture performance. The positive 
effect of polychronicity on performance is partially mediated by strategic decision speed and 
comprehensiveness. Specifically, TMT polychronicity has a positive influence on decision 
                                                 
e
 Results for all the robustness checks in this manuscript can be obtained on request by the first author 
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speed, which is positively related to financial performance. In contrast, polychronicity has a 
negative effect on decision comprehensiveness, which is negatively related with performance.  
Theoretical Contributions and Implications for Research 
We make three broad contributions to the literature. Firstly, we advance strategic 
leadership research and upper echelons theory. We focus on a cultural (value based) 
characteristic of the TMT, which has received little empirical attention (polychronicity). 
Research on the effect of executive values is a wide open field (Finkelstein et al., 2009; p.57) 
because of the difficulty of gathering empirical data (Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006; 
Hambrick, 2007). We also introduce decision-process variables as mediators of the link 
between the TMT characteristic of polychronicity and firm performance, taking a step 
towards opening the “black-box” of the upper echelons theory (Hambrick 2005, 2007). 
Despite conceptual arguments that decision making processes might intervene between team 
characteristics and outcomes (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Ocasio 1997), little empirical work has 
been done to illustrate the exact relationships. Few empirical studies have linked TMT 
characteristics with decision making processes (e.g., Miller et al., 1998 and Papadakis et al., 
1998) and few studies have empirically tested mediating relationships (e.g., Simons, et al., 
1999 and Cho and Hambrick, 2006).  
Secondly we contribute to the attention based view of the firm (Ocasio, 1997). We 
argue that norms of time-allocation of top managers (such as polychronicity) are an 
important category of attention-structures not mentioned in Ocasio’s model. The relationship 
between norms about time allocation and managerial focus of attention is an interesting and 
open area for further research on attention.  Moreover, we extend the concept of firm-level 
attention-structures to the level of the TMT. We propose that since the TMT makes strategic 
decisions, team-level attention structures should guide the organizational focus of attention.  
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Thirdly, focusing on TMT polychronicity, we extend work on the nature of managerial 
work (Mintzberg, 1973; Kotter, 1982a; Eisenhardt, 1989). Finkelstein et al. (2009; p.41) 
noted that despite the initial enthusiasm for understanding what managers do with their time, 
little research has been done to extend the ideas of the early authors. We extend this line of 
work by introducing the established and measurable construct of polychronicity to capture 
Mintzberg’s and Kotter’s description of interwoven activity-sequencing. We go beyond the 
“typical manager” to argue that there is variation in polychronic orientation among TMTs. 
Extending the early qualitative studies, we explore the relationship between polychronicity 
and financial performance using quantitative data from a large sample. 
In general, in the spirit of viewing strategic management as an interdisciplinary field 
(McGahan and Mitchell, 2003) we relate polychronicity (a behavioral construct) with 
business-strategy. We clarified what the construct means in the context of managerial work 
and we linked it with managerial attention as the bridge towards organizational outcomes. 
Finally, despite the fact that we do not have reasons to believe that our results are specific to 
the UK geographical context, our European sample offers a sought-after international 
perspective to the literature of strategic leadership (Elenkov, Judge and Wright, 2005; Tsui, 
2008).    
Managerial implications, Extensions and Limitations 
Our study has significant implications for top management teams and new ventures. 
First, it supports the contention that polychronicity matters. Polychronicity is one of the 
subtler, yet more profound ways TMTs can differ from each other (Bluedorn, 1992). 
Therefore, managers should be aware of their own and their teams’ polychronic orientation. 
Our results contrast the prescriptions of the popular literature on time management 
advocating task prioritization and sequential execution (Covey, Merrill and Merrill 1994; 
Griessman, 1994; Tracy, 2007). In the particular context of dynamic, unanalyzable 
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environments polychronicity has a positive impact on performance. Being polychronic 
enables top management teams to reach a strategic decision faster and with less emphasis on 
analysis. In turn higher speed and less analysis raise firm performance.  
A potential extension of our work would be to investigate who defines TMT 
polychronic culture. Is it the CEO? A broader question is whether and how individual time-
oriented preferences act as a catalyst or pacing mechanism for subsequent group preferences 
and behavioral tendencies. An early example of this line of work is the study by Waller, 
Giambatista and Zellmer-Bruhn (1999), who found that individual time-urgency affects 
group polychronicity. Another possible determinant of polychronicity is national culture 
(Hall, 1959). Do cultural characteristics affect the preference for working on many tasks 
simultaneously? International samples in similar working contexts would be appropriate to 
answer this question. 
A related question for future research is whether TMTs can modify their time-use 
preferences and behavioral tendencies in order to improve performance. Does education or 
training have an effect on polychronicity? If polychronicity has an effect on strategic 
decision-making and performance as our results indicated, can we do something to develop 
polychronic TMTs or should we just look for polychronic executives?  Given our findings, 
we wonder what other impact polychronicity has on organizations. For example, would 
polychronicity influence strategic planning or organizational structure? 
At a broader level, researchers should continue to unravel other temporal constructs and 
to investigate the interrelationships of these forces and their impact on organizational 
behaviors and outcomes. Whilst temporal dynamics are very much at the heart of new 
ventures, scholars still know very little about how time or temporal constructs impact actors 
in new ventures. 
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Like any study, ours has its limitations. First, results only generalize to dynamic 
environments. We cannot assert that we would find similar mediation effects in mature and 
stable industries, where TMTs have to make big-money bets to gain economies of scale. It is 
intuitively reasonable to argue that in mature industries comprehensive decision making 
would be more beneficial than decision speed, as wrong decisions are hard to undo.  
Second, there may be other uncontrolled team mechanisms (e.g., cohesion or debate) 
that also affect decision speed and comprehensiveness as well as performance. This is a 
common limitation in most survey research designs, especially TMT studies. To mitigate the 
problem, at least in part, we controlled for the most common TMT demographics and firm-
specific variables, which could capture some of the variance attributed to unmeasured process 
variables. We also controlled for environmental dynamism (and in particular ambiguity) by 
selecting a context of new technology ventures, but we did not specifically measure fine-
grained aspects of the environment, as this was beyond the scope of our study. 
Third, since our decision making process measures did not ask respondents to think 
about one specific decision, we did not explicitly control for decision type. However, the 
scales in the questionnaire clearly indicated that we were asking about characteristics of 
important, strategic decisions and there is evidence that decision-specific measures and more 
general scales like ours yield similar values (Wally and Baum, 1994). Fourth, since 
performance is a multidimensional construct, other measures of firm performance such as 
sales growth, or market share could show different relationships. For the purpose of 
comparison with previous research, we selected two of the most common measures of 
financial performance: ROTA and ROS.  A fifth limitation, given our cross-sectional research 
design, is that we cannot reliably predict the direction of the cause-effect relationships. 
Finally, since we had two respondents per TMT we cannot be absolutely certain about the 
quality of the team-level data. What we measured might be the perception of the CEOs about 
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their team’s polychronicity, confirmed by their ‘second in command’. This was due to the 
difficulty of obtaining responses from all or most TMT members.   
Conclusion 
Previous research has shown that to increase performance in unstable and unanalyzable 
environments, strategic decisions must be made quickly (Eisenhardt, 1989; Baum and Wally, 
2003) using less comprehensive research and analysis (Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984; 
Atuahene-Gima and Li, 2004). Moreover, information-processing theory argued that to deal 
with environmental ambiguity, the key is not a great quantity of information but insightful 
information (Daft and Lengel, 1984). Our study provides an important addition to the above 
thesis: It contends that polychronicity is a TMT characteristic that enables casual collection 
of insightful information (as argued by Mintzberg, 1973), that reduces the need for 
comprehensiveness (analyzing in depth every aspect of every alternative) and increases 
decision speed, thus raising the firm’s financial performance. 
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Appendix 1: A validation of the polychronicity scale and of our core assumptions using 
interviews of  companies in the sample   
 
Background of the Interviews 
The primary purpose of the interviews (part of our wider research program) was to delve deeper and understand 
further the issue of how top management teams understand and deal with the various aspects related to ‘time’.  
In the original survey instrument, respondents were allowed the option to indicate if follow-up interviews were 
possible. In total, 8 companies were interviewed. Interviews ranged from 2 – 6 separate sessions per company, 
involved between 2 to 4 TMT members as respondents, each lasting between 1 to 1 ½ hours. The interviews 
were conducted after the questionnaires were returned. The range of questions was purposely broad, addressing 
all issues such as strategy, resources, structure and industry factors with the intention to uncover if (and to what 
extent) temporal issues were pertinent. 
Purpose of this appendix 
This appendix has a dual purpose:  
1. We compare selected statements regarding the polychronic orientation of TMTs (from the interviews), with 
their score in the polychronicity scale (from the questionnaire). We observe that the scale captured the 
polychronic orientation described in words. This adds evidence for the convergent validity of the scale.  
2. We present selected statements supporting our two key assumptions that a) polychronicity preference predicts 
behavior and b) TMT members exhibit similarity in their polychronic preference and behavior.   
 
Firm 
Code  
 
 
 
Scale 
Score 
 
  
 
 
 
 
TMT 
Type 
Selected Statements validating the convergent 
validity of the scale (i.e. what the scale captured 
converges with what managers described in words) 
Selected statements supporting our two key 
assumptions  
a) polychronic preference predict behavior 
(regardless of external conditions) 
b) TMT members exhibit similarity in their 
polychronic preference and behavior 
 
NTV 6 
 
 
 
4.8  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poly 
chronic 
 
 
This team prides itself at being able to oversee several 
on-going projects at the same time quite easily. It is like 
a badge of honor, for example, to be on 10 apps at any 
one moment and switch between each without breaking a 
sweat. If you ask them, I’m sure they’ll tell you they 
wouldn’t want it any other way. They would be bored if 
they had to work on just one specific thing at a time. I 
guess, at the end of the day, we enjoy the variety, that 
constant switching, the challenge of needing to 
concentrate harder simply because you have to, at least 
in order to freeze whatever you’re doing and still be able 
to come back to it without losing track. Yes… it’s a 
buzz! 
You can say it’s this team and organization’s 
DNA. It’s just how we’re wired. No matter 
what the conditions are, we need to be on top 
of everything, every single second of the day. 
Like I said before, badge of honour, 
remember?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
NTV 3  
 
 
 
 
 
4.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poly 
chronic 
 
 
Right now, we have multiple projects going on at the 
same time and no surprises, they all need to go to market 
fast. All require “our immediate attention” (respondent 
mimes inverted commas). So it’s a good thing we’re 
pretty darn good at multitasking and improvising on the 
fly. We make it work… we see this as a chance to cross 
pollinate ideas, test possible links between projects or 
innovations that would otherwise remain on the drawing 
board. Our approach has served us well and I think the 
rest of the team absolutely agrees with me… 
 
We multitask all the time here not simply 
because we can because we want to…   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NTV 8  
 
 
 
4.4 
 
 
 
 
Poly 
chronic 
It’s unavoidable! When you’re in charge, there are many 
balls all up in the air at once and we can’t afford to let 
anything drop. So what do you do? Deal with it! Keep 
your eyes on everything, every time!! Otherwise, you 
have no business leading your company. 
Look, I’ve known these guys from way back 
and the common red thread is whether at work 
or play, they’re driven, switched on, with 
many things on the go all at once. Drives some 
nuts but hey…. 
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NTV 7 
4.2 
 
 
 
 
 
Poly 
chronic 
 
Overlapping and juggling several projects at the same 
time is the key to growing this company. As the 
executive team of a young company, it is absolutely vital 
that we have the corresponding bandwidth to deal with 
multiple issues real time. We don’t have the luxury of 
letting urgent things stew and coming back to it. 
Anyway, it’s always best to deal with urgent things 
straightaway and send it out the door. That way, it’s done 
and dusted and we can get back to what we’re doing. To 
be responsive, you can’t do things one at a time, right? 
 
I’m proud that even during the quieter months, 
we actively look out for new things to do to 
add on to what’s already in the pipes. It goes 
back to what I was saying about the key to 
growing our young company, bandwidth and 
multiplicity… 
    
 
 
 
NTV 1 
4.2 
 
 
 
 
Poly 
chronic 
 
 
Being single minded is great but working on one thing at 
a time only poses serious downsides….after a while, you 
might find yourself putting too many eggs in that one 
basket… In handling multiple offerings at one go, we 
actually enable a helicopter view of our business. I 
suppose it could overwhelm the uninitiated but we 
actually prefer it this way. It’s fulfilling… gives us 
control over tracking progress on all fronts.  
 
 
 
NTV 2 
2.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mono 
chronic 
 
 
Although we’re managing several projects right now, as 
best as we can, we break them down into specific phases 
with specific deadlines and deal with them separately. In 
our opinion and actually from experience, this is the 
most efficient way of getting things done. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the early days, we made a conscious effort 
to put some structures in place, including 
zeroing in on issues one at a time …why?! 
Well, how else can a company function? To 
give you an example, we had a guy then, 
brilliant, but he was all over the place. He had 
a million new ideas swirling in his head, 
always working on multiple proposals, 
constantly jumping in and out of assignments. 
He was pulling some of us in so many different 
directions, it got really (interviewee 
emphasised) frustrating. It’s not to say that 
nothing got done…but it was crazy. 
Eventually, he had to leave, maybe feeling as 
frustrated as we did. Pity really, since it’s more 
a work style conflict rather than anything.  
 
NTV 5 
1.4 
 
 
 
 
Mono 
chronic 
 
Finishing things on schedule is important to us. To do so, 
we need to focus. Block out all the other issues and give 
it our undivided attention. For example, in a meeting, if 
it’s not in the agenda, we don’t discuss it. We are strict 
on checking items off the list, dealing with them point by 
point, one by one, and then move on swiftly. We are far 
more productive this way and these meetings, well, they 
finish on time! 
 
There is mutual understanding on how things 
should be done. Whether we’re swamped or 
simply having a standard day, we create 
process flow charts to breakdown and pin point 
critical action steps to make sure we give 
uninterrupted attention on each step. Everyone 
is firmly on the same page on this.  
 
 
NTV 4 
1 
 
 
 
 
Mono 
chronic 
 
 
We don’t believe in multitasking. It’s the surest way to 
have quality compromised…  
 
Hopping from one project to another? Is that really wise? 
I mean, there is no time to really think things through, 
right? I believe it would only ruin our concentration and 
disrupt our thought process and quite frankly, if we 
absolutely had to, we’ll probably manage but let me tell 
you right now, we won’t like it one bit! 
It doesn’t matter if anyone thinks one project is 
less revenue-generating than another. Once 
we’re on it, our absolute priority lies in 
finishing what we’ve started. And the best way 
to check off the to-do list is to simply 
concentrate on sending out projects one after 
the other, one at a time. This is how we choose 
to do things around here and I think it’s fair to 
say that we’ve been consistent with it. 
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Appendix 2: The high polychronicity and low polychronicity scenarios 
 
The test 
A known-groups test for content validity compares scale scores for groups whose levels on the variable of 
interest are already known by other means. If the scale successfully differentiates the groups in the manner 
already known, it demonstrates content validity (Bluedorn, et al., 1998). In the absence of alternative 
psychometric tests to measure polychronicity, we approached the problem by creating two TMTs with known 
polychronicity levels. One scenario describes a very polychronic TMT and another scenario a very monochronic 
TMT. We based our scenarios on the ones described by Bluedorn et al. (1998) but we made adaptations. We 
took care to avoid any phrasing from the polychronicity scale or even comparably synonymous phrasing to 
make the test meaningful. We showed the scenarios to 7 experts in the polychronicity literature (faculty and 
doctoral students) and they unanimously agreed that they described high and low levels of polychronicity 
respectively. Our sample was 116 Executive MBA candidates in a leading business school in London (77 male 
and 39 female, average age = 34 years). They were all practicing managers in a range of industries (on average 
10.85 years of work experience). We split the sample in two groups. One group (58 people) was given the high 
polychronicity scenario and the other group (58 people) was given the low polychronicity scenario. Each 
participant had to read the scenario and then answer the five questions of the scale in the same way he or she 
believed members of the Top Management Team of the described venture would answer them. The instructions 
and the scenarios are presented below. 
 
The task for the Executive MBA candidates 
Please carefully read the following description of managerial work at the Top Management Team of a new 
technology-venture. After you finish reading the description, please answer the five questions on the next page 
in the same way you believe members of the Top Management Team of this venture would answer them. Jane, 
Jack and Tom are members of the Top Management Team of this venture and their behaviors are included in the 
following description. 
 
 The low-level of polychronicity scenario. 
Jane began her workday by inspecting the production line. As she inspected the line, one worker asked Jane to 
explain the company’s retirement policy. Jane said: “Please call my secretary and make an appointment to see 
me about that later. I am inspecting the production line now.” Jane returned to her inspection and received a call 
on her mobile phone. The call was from one of the company’s sales representatives who wanted to discuss about 
a common concern faced by a number of customers. Jane asked the representative to call her secretary for an 
appointment to discuss the matter and returned to her inspection of the production line. Before she finally 
finished her inspection, Jane received questions from two other workers, both of whom she referred to her 
secretary to make appointments. 
On the same day, Jack arrived to his office and examined his to-do list for the day. It contained the following 
five items: (1) developing a new performance appraisal form for the company; (2) writing a letter of 
recommendation for one of his current employees; (3) commenting on a progress report about a new product 
under development (4) preparing an oral presentation to propose a joint venture with a major supplier; and (5) 
reviewing the CVs of three job candidates. Jack picked up the task of preparing the oral presentation for the 
joint venture and worked on it for the rest of the morning, neither working on nor thinking about the other four 
projects. Jack received eight phone calls during the morning, all of which were taken by his secretary who made 
appointments with the callers for times later in the week when they should call back. This was normal for 
members of the top management team. Meetings were scheduled, interruptions were filtered by personal 
assistants and urgent requests were kept short with tactics such as having stand-up conversations and using 
verbal hints to close the encounter (“Is there anything further you need to know?” or “Thank you for the 
information. I appreciate it”). Jack made significant progress on the presentation and completed it just before 
lunch. The other four projects, however, remained untouched as the afternoon began.   
While Jane and Jack were going for lunch, Tom, the CEO, was giving a tour to a job candidate for the post of 
head of marketing. Tom pointed Jane and Jack out to the candidate from a distance and said “Those two are 
really good and efficient executives. They provide an excellent example of the way we do things around here. 
We would like every member of the top management team to handle things this way.” 
 
The high level of polychronicity scenario 
Jane began her workday by inspecting the production line. As she inspected the line, one worker asked Jane to 
explain the company’s retirement policy. Jane said: “Walk with me while I inspect the line, and I will explain 
the policy to you.” After explaining the retirement policy, Jane received a call on her mobile phone. The call 
was from one of the company’s sales representatives who wanted to discuss about a common concern faced by a 
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number of customers. Jane began discussing the concern as she continued her inspection of the production line. 
Before she finished her inspection, Jane received two more questions from workers, both of which she answered 
while continuing her inspection of the production line.  
On the same day, Jack arrived to his office and examined his to-do list for the day. It contained the following 
five items: (1) developing a new performance appraisal form for the company; (2) writing a letter of 
recommendation for one of his current employees; (3) commenting on a progress report about a new product 
under development (4) preparing an oral presentation to propose a joint venture with a major supplier; and (5) 
reviewing the CVs of three job candidates. Jack often developed ideas for the other projects while he worked on 
one of them, so he frequently switched back-and-forth among the projects throughout the morning. Jack 
received eight phone calls and two unscheduled visitors during the morning, and he talked to every single caller. 
This was normal for members of the top management team. Top-managers’ doors were literally open, offices 
had comfortable seating area and desks facing the corridor to encourage interruptions. Constant interruptions 
from subordinates, peers and externals created a back-and-forth pattern of activity. Jack made significant 
progress on several of his five projects during the morning, but more work was needed on all of the projects as 
the afternoon as the afternoon began.   
While Jane and Jack were going for lunch, Tom, the CEO, was giving a tour to a job candidate for the post of 
head of marketing. Tom pointed Jane and Jack out to the candidate from a distance and said “Those two are 
really good and efficient executives. They provide an excellent example of the way we do things around here. 
We would like every member of the top management team to handle things this way.” 
 
Results 
The mean scale-score for the high polychronicity scenario was 4.16; for the low polychronicity scenario the 
mean was 1.92, a highly significant (t=15.3, p<0.001) mean difference of 2.24 in the 5-point scale. The alpha 
coefficient of the scale was 0.94. In correlational terms, these results give an r and an eta of 0.82 (p<0.01) (r and 
eta being identical in this case because the scenario variable is a dichotomy). Therefore the test confirmed the 
scale’s content validity 
 
 
 
 
 
 43 
 
Figure 1: The study’s conceptual model 
 
Appendix 3: Results of principal component analysis with varimax rotation of 
polychronicity, strategic decision speed and strategic decision comprehensiveness items 
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Polychronicity     
We believe people should try to do many things at the same time. .81   
We would rather focus on one project each day than on parts of several projects. a .80   
We tend to juggle several activities at the same time. .93   
We think it is best and tend to complete one task before beginning another. a .92   
We believe it is best for people to be given several tasks and projects to perform 
simultaneously. .94   
Strategic Decision Speed    
We prefer and tend to take our time when making strategic decisions. a   .81 
We generally believe in making quick strategic decisions.    .82 
Please tick the extent (1 being “Not at all” to 5 being “To a great extent”) on which your 
company places on: Speed when planning or thinking about strategies    .89 
Strategic Decision Comprehensiveness    
Faced with an immediate, important, non-routine threat or opportunity, we usually: Develop 
many alternative responses.  .74  
Faced with an immediate, important, non-routine threat or opportunity, we usually: Consider 
many different criteria and issues when deciding the course of action to take.  .84  
Faced with an immediate, important, non-routine threat or opportunity, we usually: 
Thoroughly examine multiple explanations for the problem or opportunity.  .88  
Faced with an immediate, important, non-routine threat or opportunity, we usually: Conduct 
multiple examinations for the suggested course of action.  .68  
Faced with an immediate, important, non-routine threat or opportunity, we usually: Search 
extensively for possible responses.  .74  
 
a
 This item was reverse coded. 
Following Hair et al.’s (1998) suggestion, all factor loadings < 0.45 were excluded from the table given our sample size (N= 129). 
 
Table 1: Basic demographics of respondents 
 Age mean 
(years) 
Age standard 
deviation (years) 
Team tenure 
mean (years) 
Formal post-secondary 
education mean (years) 
CEO respondents (n=197) 50 10 2.5 5.3 
Second respondents (n=129) 50.5 2.2 2.2 4.9 
 
 
Polychronicity 
in Top 
Management 
Teams 
Strategic Decision 
Speed 
Strategic Decision 
Comprehensiveness 
H2  + 
New Venture 
Financial 
Performance 
H3  - 
H4 +  
H5 - 
H1  + 
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TABLE 2 Means, Standard Deviations (S.D), Cronbach’s Alpha (CA), Composite Reliability (CR), Average Variance Extractedf (AVE) and 
Correlationsg 
 
* p < 0.05 (2 tailed)   ** p < 0.01 (2-tailed) 
                                                 
f
 Where applicable 
g
 N =  129 
h
 NMF = Non Meaningful 
 Variable Mean S.D CA CR AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 Financial Performance (Standardised measure) 0 0.98                           
2 
 
TMT Polychronicity 2.97 1.17 0.96 0.97 0.87 0.61** 0.93                     
 
3 Strategic Decision Speed 2.99 1.22 0.96 0.93 0.81 0.66** 0.65** 0.90                    
 
4 Strategic Decision Comprehensiveness 3.17 0.91 0.86 0.93 0.73 -0.64** -0.38** -0.50** 0.85                    
5 Firm Size (Log N) 2.49 0.76    0.30** 0.32** 0.30** -0.27**                   
 
6 Firm Age 4.91 2.16    0.15 0.11 0.13 -0.12 0.13                  
 
7 TMT Size 7.67 2.56    0.14 0.17 0.05 -0.03 0.57** 0.09                 
 
8 TMT Average Age 49.36 3.73    0.26** 0.16 0.17* -0.10 0.31** 0.26** 0.16                
 
9 TMT Average Tenure 2.32 1.26    0.26** 0.28** 0.21* -0.16 0.14 0.66** 0.09 0.23**               
 
10 TMT Average Educational Level 4.88 0.50    0.12 -0.05 0.06 -0.09 0.16 0.31** 0.22* 0.19* 0.20*             
11 TMT Age Diversity 0.17 0.06    -0.20* -0.09 -0.20* 0.08 -0.09 0.02 0.15 -0.25** 0.01 -0.01           
 
12 TMT Team Tenure Diversity 0.36 0.29    0.06 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.15 0.64** 0.30** 0.11 0.50** 0.24** 0.05          
13 TMT Educational Diversity 0.18 0.05    0.22* 0.13 -0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.27** 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.04        
14 Industry: IT 0.36 0.48    -0.22* 0.01 -0.12 0.01 -0.14 -0.16 -0.17 -0.23** -0.12 -0.32** 0.03 -0.10 -0.30**      
 
15 Industry: Telecoms 0.08 0.27    -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.07 0.08 -0.04 0.12 0.03 -0.10 -0.06 0.04 -0.04 0.00 NMFh     
 
16 Industry: Chemicals/Materials 0.05 0.21    0.19* 0.17 0.18* 0.15 -0.02 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.13 -0.01 -0.14 0.09 0.18 NMF NMF     
17 Industry: Electronics 0.13 0.34    0.12 0.08 0.12 -0.03 0.06 0.20 -0.01 0.22* 0.23** 0.12 -0.01 0.07 0.21 NMF NMF NMF   
 
18 Industry: Drugs 0.05 0.21    0.12 0.02 0.14 -0.13 0.08 0.21 0.07 0.00 0.09 0.25** -0.03 0.16 0.06 NMF NMF NMF NMF  
 
19 Industry:  Technology Services 0.19 0.39    0.02 -0.11 -0.14 -0.03 -0.14 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.32** 0.04 0.11 0.03 NMF NMF NMF NMF NMF  
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TABLE 3. Results of hierarchical OLS regression analysis for strategic decision 
speed & comprehensiveness9 
 
 Strategic decision speed Strategic decision comprehensiveness 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Firm Size 
 0.34**  0.12 -0.35** -0.23* 
Firm Age -0.10 -0.01  0.08  -0.13 
TMT Size -0.16 -0.16+  0.13   0.13 
TMT Average Age   0.02  0.02  0.04   0.04 
TMT Average Tenure   0.17 -0.04 -0.16 -0.05 
TMT Educational Level -0.01  0.07 -0.02 -0.06 
TMT Age Diversity -0.11 -0.08  0.07  0.05 
TMT Team Tenure Diversity   0.03  0.05  0.15  0.14 
TMT Educational Diversity  -0.08 -0.15* -0.13 -0.10 
  
 
 
 
Industry: IT -0.03 -0.13 -0.07  0.01 
Industry: Telecoms  0.03  0.02  0.05 -0.06 
Industry: Chemicals/Materials 
 0.19+  0.08  0.17  0.23* 
Industry: Electronics  0.11  0.05  0.03  0.06 
Industry: Drugs  0.14  0.09 -0.10 -0.07 
Industry:  Technology Services -0.04 -0.07 -0.08  -0.06 
  
 
 
 
Polychronicity  0.65***  -0.35*** 
  
 
  
R2  .22  .54  .18  .27 
Adjusted R2  .12  .47  .07  .17 
F  2.13* 8.20*** 1.67+ 2.65** R2  .32   .09 
F for R2  77.57***  14.35*** 
 
      +
 p <  0.10    * p <  0.05   ** p <  0.01   *** p <  0.001  
 
TABLE 4. Results of hierarchical Robust Standard Errors regression analysis 
for financial performance 
 
 Standardized Measure of Financial Performance (ROTA + ROS)  
Variables Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
 
      
Firm Size 
 0.29**  0.11  0.01  0.06  0.01  0.01 
Firm Age -0.06  0.02 -0.06  0.02 -0.05 -0.04 
TMT Size -0.03 -0.03  0.09  0.04  0.04  0.06 
TMT Average Age  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.04  0.07  0.06 
TMT Average Tenure 
 0.25*  0.08  0.11  0.09  0.05  0.06 
TMT Educational Level -0.01  0.05 -0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01 
TMT Age Diversity -0.14 -0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 
TMT Team Tenure Diversity -0.11 -0.10 -0.06 -0.12 -0.03 -0.05 
TMT Educational Diversity  0.14  0.08  0.11+ 
 0.14*  0.03  0.07 
       
Industry: IT -0.02 -0.10  -0.04  -0.05 -0.11 -0.08 
Industry: Telecoms  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.00  0.04  0.03 
Industry: Chemicals/Materials 
 0.16  0.07 
 0.16*  0.03  0.18*  0.14* 
Industry: Electronics 
 0.07  0.02  0.04  0.00  0.06  0.04 
Industry: Drugs 
 0.12  0.08  0.02  0.04  0.05  0.03 
Industry:  Technology Services 
 0.11  0.08  0.09  0.11  0.05  0.07 
 
 
 
 
   
Polychronicity  
 0.53***   0.25**  0.36***  0.24** 
Strategic decision Speed  
  0.38***  0.44***   0.23** 
Strategic decision comprehensiveness  
 -0.44***  -0.50*** -0.43*** 
 
      
R2 .26 .48 .65 .57 .66 .68 
F  3.47*** 8.43*** 10.66*** 10.31*** 10.77*** 13.05*** 
R2  From model 5  
.22 
from 
model 5 
 .39 
from 
model 6  
.09 
from 
model 6  
.18 
From 
model 6  
.20 
 
        +
 p <  0.10        * p <  0.05    ** p <  0.01   *** p <  0.001 
 
                                                 
9
 Regression coefficients shown are standardized coefficients (). Boldface indicates significant coefficients. N=129.  
